Philosophy at Cambridge, Newsletter of the Faculty of Philosophy by Pellegrino, Mariella
Philosophy at Cambridge page 1 May 2006
Philosophy at Cambridge
Newsletter of the Faculty of Philosophy
Issue 3
May 2006 
From the Chair
In the latest admissions round
Cambridge received a record number of
applications to read Philosophy, against
the background of a slight fall
nationwide. A comment from the Higher
Education Minister that this fall was no
bad thing reignited debate on whether
and why the study of Philosophy is
important. Some contributors to this
issue offer thoughts relevant to this
question. Perhaps you have views. If so
we would be glad to hear from you.
The substantial modifications to the
Raised Faculty Building in 2000
brought a welcome improvement in our
accommodation, with the new Graduate
Centre and Common Room providing
the active and friendly centre for social
and intellectual life which we had
hoped. But we are still short of space.
So when changes elsewhere in the
University provided an opportunity to
extend into neighbouring areas of our
building the chance was too good to
miss. Over the summer the Casimir
Lewy Library is moving to quieter and
more spacious premises, while the area
vacated will be redeveloped for offices
and an undergraduate Common 
Room.
Another preoccupation of this year
has been our Appeal, which as I write
has raised £350k, with another £1m in
prospect, if matching funds can be
found. But money and bricks and
mortar are important only insofar as
they enable people to do things they 
find worthwhile. In this context it is
worth noting the achievements of some
of our current students (reported
elsewhere in this Newsletter) and the
continuing enthusiasm of (at least 
some of) our alumni for philosophical
reflection.
Jane Heal FBA
Professor of Philosophy
Chair of the Philosophy Faculty Board
Too Beautiful to be True
David Waterman
Much though I had been fascinated
by my philosophy studies at
Cambridge, by 1975, the year in
which I completed my doctorate on
free will, I knew that I wanted to
devote myself to music, which had a
stronger hold over my heart. My
precise ambition was to be the cellist
of a string quartet and I am very
fortunate to be a founder-member of
the Endellion Quartet, now at the
start of its 28th year and, by happy
chance, the Quartet in Residence at
Cambridge University.
Playing an instrument is of course
radically different from the practice 
of philosophy. Whereas the latter is 
an entirely cerebral activity, the
instrumentalist needs to call upon
every part of his being and fuse these
parts into an integrated human
utterance. The technical skills required
are so refined and exacting that
classical musicians characteristically
begin their training as
infants and never cease to
practise and rehearse for
hours every day.
The interpretative
responses of the performer
must be rooted in a
strong and appropriate
emotional reaction to
the spirit behind a
musical score and all its
details, reinforced by a
close analysis of the
piece, a historically
informed understanding
of its meaning, and an
empathy with the poetic
imagination of the
composer. At a certain
stage, any dualistic
distinction between the
technical and interpretative
aspects of playing breaks 
down — a point of 
integration is reached where the
player’s movements directly and
effortlessly embody his musical
intentions — just as a dancer’s leap
may embody his exhilaration.
As well as each player having to
exercise soul, brain and body in an
organic unity, almost all musicians
have to co-operate as a team. 
Players have to interact responsively
and intelligently. In rehearsal (as in
teaching), analytical insight and
virtuosity of expression together
with tact and toughness are required
when offering and receiving
criticisms and suggestions in a way
which is fruitful and not destructive.
Chamber music in particular
involves no hierarchies and demands
teamwork of the highest order.
Playing an instrument in a 
group is, therefore, an activity which
involves the whole human being 
to an almost unique degree. 
The Endellion Quartet are recording for Warner Classics 
(Illustration by Sara Fanelli)
continued on page 8
The evening of the first day of the
Alumni Weekend last September saw
the Faculty mounting a light-hearted
debate: who was Cambridge’s
greatest philosopher? We had
selected four candidates: Ludwig
Wittgenstein was sponsored by Jane
Heal, Bertrand Russell by Arif
Ahmed, Frank Ramsey by Hugh
Mellor, and Francis Bacon by myself.
The event had originally been
scheduled for the Winstanley theatre
in Trinity, but the demand meant
that we had to move to a larger
venue in the Law Faculty. Edward
Craig held the ring. A packed and
appreciative audience sat down to a
slide-show of a far greater number of
Cambridge stars, including Benjamin
Whichcote, William Whewell,
William Clifford, John McTaggart,
C.D. Broad, Alfred North Whitehead,
John Wisdom, and Bernard Williams,
accompanied by Cole Porter’s
‘You’re the Tops’.
Arif spoke passionately on behalf
of Bertrand Russell’s liberalism and
secularism, touching only lightly on
the impenetrable pages of Principia
Mathematica, which are still able to
shock and awe aspiring logicians.
Jane gave an eloquent account of the
revolution in philosophy associated
with the later Wittgenstein. 
Could it be that human beings are
endowed by evolution with a HADD
(hyperactive agency detecting device),
which leads us to see trees or streams 
as acting and speaking to us? Could it
be that certain ideas thrown up by the
The opportunities for knowledge
transfer from the arts and humanities
to industry were explored in a
conference held at Gonville and Caius
last December. Conceived and
organised by the Faculty’s Forum for
Philosophy in Business, the conference
brought together academics from
across the world with representatives
from leading businesses. After a
keynote speech given by Professor
Philip Esler (Chief Executive, Arts and
Humanities Research Council), the
conference examined three sample
areas of engagement with industry:
Philosophy, Anthropology and Music.
Hugh sketched Ramsey’s extraordinary
genius in many different fields, and
proved his superiority with a
spreadsheet showing how few years
beyond the age of twenty it took for
him to display that genius (seven, as
opposed, for example, to Russell’s
seventy-eight). I brought up the rear,
with a crafty claim that Bacon’s early
championship of the scientific
revolution of the seventeenth century
must put him first in a ranking of
importance, if not philosophical depth
or achievement. I carefully avoided
revealing the various cloven hooves
he showed during his time as Lord
Chancellor, including his penchant 
for bribery.
Somewhat to everyone’s surprise,
Bacon romped home, with something
over 90 votes, beating Ramsey (41)
and Russell (40) with poor Wittgenstein
(25) trailing the field. My suggestion,
which would surely have appealed to
Bacon, that we should measure depth
of commitment, as well as mere
numbers, by selling the right to cast
extra votes at a tenner a shot to the
Faculty Appeal, was unfortunately 
not tried out.
Simon Blackburn FBA
Professor of Philosophy
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The reception at Gonville and Caius
Dr Alan Blackwell (Computer Laboratory) and
Dr David Good (Social and Political Sciences)
Who’s the Tops?
Simon Blackburn
The Heffer Lecture 2006
Mr Peter Mather (BP) and Mr Rob Douglas
(South East England Development Agency)
Dan Dennett giving the Heffer Lecture 2006
For further information about the
conference and the Forum, see
www.phil.cam.ac.uk
HADD are particularly likely to
intrigue us and be repeated — and that
these memes of folk religion are the
wild ancestors of the cultivated memes
which are our great religious traditions? 
To some it may seem irreverent or
improper to consider such ideas. But
Daniel Dennett argues that the nature,
origins and development of religions
should not be off limits for study by
evolutionary theorists and other
scientists. A large and enthusiastic
audience filled the Lady Mitchell Hall,
and overflowed to watch a video link in
the Little Hall, when Professor Dennett
gave a lively presentation of his
thoughts at this year’s Heffer Lecture.
Daniel Dennett’s Breaking the spell:
religion as a natural phenomenon is
published by Allen Lane 
(ISBN 0713997893)
In public life and in his academic work
Bertrand Russell represents the best 
of Cambridge Philosophy. He was
both example and advocate. 
Russell was born into the Whig
aristocracy. His grandfather had 
twice been Prime Minister and he
himself was engaged in domestic and
international politics for most of his
long adult life. In 1910 he was nearly
selected to stand for Parliament as a
liberal, and would have done so but
for his religious heterodoxy. The last
thing he wrote, in 1970, was on the
political crisis in the Middle East. 
But philosophy came before politics,
both in time and in order of
understanding, so we begin there.
Like Hobbes, Russell’s
philosophical interests go back 
to his first acquaintance
with Euclid. In 1883 
his brother Frank
undertook to teach him
the Elements. As you
would expect, young
Bertrand made swift
progress. The work is
of special interest
because it involves the
rigorous deduction of
elaborate and often
quite surprising facts
from a bare minimum
of assumptions, or
axioms. The derived
facts or theorems could
be known for certain to
be true if the axioms
were true. But why
believe the axioms? 
To this Frank had no
answer save the pragmatic one that
unless they were taken for granted
one could not hope to get on. This
was quite dissatisfying. Thus began
Russell’s long quest for certainty. 
Of course the quest itself was
hardly new. Ever since Descartes’
day, but with increasing despondency
since Hume’s, philosophers sought 
to give an infallible basis for
scientific knowledge. Russell was
helped by having at his disposal the
tools of modern logic, a discipline
which at the end of the nineteenth
and beginning of the twentieth
century made more progress than at
any time since Aristotle’s. Agreeing
with Hume that most of natural
science was not certain, Russell
applied these tools to mathematics. 
shoot him before he shoots you?”
— if I were to say this, any small
shopkeeper would think me mad.
But when the Government says 
it with emphasis and a brass band,
the small shopkeepers become
enthusiastic, and are quite surprised
when they find afterwards that
business has suffered.
Russell’s battles with authority were
not confined to paper. He was
repeatedly arrested for his political
views and protests. He was
imprisoned during the Great War 
for suggesting that the US troops
then stationed in Britain might be
used for quelling domestic dissent. 
He founded his own school and 
was later involved in setting up the
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.
The point is not that 
all of his political
beliefs were true. 
What is important was
that he believed, and
acted upon, what he
could find reasons for. 
How else should a
philosopher live?
If you asked me 
what is the one thing 
I want my students to
remember when they
leave Cambridge, I’d 
say this: to think for
themselves. I am
surprised at how many
people still think we
should “respect” beliefs
that are “deeply” or
widely held, regardless
of how bigoted or
superstitious they are (I am thinking
particularly but not exclusively of
religious beliefs). I think that is all
wrong. I think we should only respect
beliefs that have some basis in reason
and experience. We should suspect
those that rest solely on tradition and
authority. At least we should if we are
to remain living in a free society. 
I think the teaching of philosophy at
universities, when done properly, can
do much to promote this attitude. 
But we can learn from Russell too.
Nobody since Voltaire has better fused
philosophical thought and political
action in the service of these principles.
Arif Ahmed, University Lecturer in
Philosophy
How much of it could be put on a
logical, and hence quite certain,
basis? The answer was a long time
coming and was disappointing. 
The verdict of Whitehead and
Russell’s monumental Principia
Mathematica was: not all of it. 
It was left to Gödel to show 20 years
later that this result was in a sense
inevitable.
The quest for certainty is not just
the intellectual perversity of somebody
carried away with his own cleverness.
It is instead the philosophical aspect
of an attitude that also finds political
and religious expression. It is the idea
that there are no special or natural
sources of authority other than one’s
own senses and reasoning. Blind
acceptance of dogma advances strife
and hinders progress. It is when men
reject tradition and dogma that real
progress is possible.
Liberal individualism is this
attitude’s political expression. Russell’s
political preoccupations are entirely
in keeping with this, stemming like
his philosophical ones from a spirit 
of restless scepticism. His instinctive
horror of the state’s power and
distrust of its blandishments are evident
in the following passage from ‘Free
Thought and Official Propaganda’:
If I were to go to a small
shopkeeper and say: “Look at your
competitor over the way: he is
getting your business; don’t you
think it would be a good plan to
leave your business and stand up in
the middle of the road and try to
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Why Believe the Axioms?
Arif Ahmed
“So, year after year, Silas Marner
had lived in this solitude, 
his guineas rising in the iron pot,
and his life narrowing and
hardening itself more and more
into a mere pulsation of desire 
and satisfaction that had no
relation to any other being. 
His life had reduced itself to 
the functions of weaving and
hoarding, without any
contemplation of an end towards
which the functions tended. 
The same sort of process has
perhaps been undergone by wiser
men, when they have been cut 
off from faith and love — only,
instead of a loom and a heap of
guineas, they have had some
erudite research, some ingenious
project, or some well-knit theory.”
I love the work of George Eliot.
Of all the classical novelists in our
language I would describe her bent 
of mind as philosophical. It’s what
especially draws me to her work.
“An eminent philosopher among
my friends, who can dignify even
your ugly furniture by lifting it 
into the serene light of science, 
has shown me this pregnant little
fact. Your pier-glass or extensive
surface of polished steel made to
be rubbed by a housemaid, will 
be minutely and multitudinously
scratched in all directions; but
place now against it a lighted
this encouraged me. Besides, I 
thought I knew well enough what 
the word ‘philosophy’ meant, and
never doubted as I made my
application that I would be able to
spend most of my time returning to
the authors into whose work I had
already dipped as a young amateur
— and learn too about their 20th-
century successors, and about the
application of philosophical and
ethical principles to modern
problems.
This did not prove the case. 
Any first-year undergraduate then
taking the Philosophy Tripos 
quickly sensed that so far as the 
best-regarded Cambridge dons and
postgraduate students in our field
were concerned, Ethics was a subject
which had unfortunately strayed into
Philosophy from the departments
where French and English Literature
were studied, and ought to be sent
back there. The professor whose
lectures felt (to me) most in tune
with what I thought I wanted to
study, was the late Bernard Williams,
whose lecture series was wonderfully
engaging and clear. But I heard the
sneers. One of my teachers dubbed
Williams’s series (those were
chauvinist days) “An Intelligent
Woman’s Introduction to
Philosophy”, and the joke caught on.
I resented all this. No doubt if 
I had taken more easily to
mathematical logic, Wittgenstein,
and Gilbert Ryle and become a star
student in philosophy of this kind, 
I should not have been so quick to
suspect that philosophy at
Cambridge was headed up a dusty
cul-de-sac; and maybe part of my
complaint was that I simply didn’t
understand a lot of what went under
the name of philosophy at our
University. Still, I did after two 
years achieve a respectable 2.i in my
Part I examinations — and headed
with relief to a Part II in Law, 
which after Philosophy seemed
almost ludicrously easy.
To this day I would direct any
undergraduate restless in the
Philosophy Tripos towards
Jurisprudence in the Law Tripos: 
the subject was fascinating,
important, easy, and (in my view)
rather indifferently served both in
the universities and among the
highest reaches of the British
candle as a centre
of illumination, 
and lo! the scratches
will seem to
arrange themselves
in a fine series of
concentric circles
round that little sun.
It is demonstrable
that the scratches
are going
everywhere
impartially and it is
only your candle
which produces the
flattering illusion 
of a concentric
arrangement, its
light falling with 
an exclusive optical
selection. These
things are a parable.
The scratches are
events, and the candle is the
egoism of any person …”
If in the spring of 1969 you 
had asked me what a university
meant by ‘Philosophy’, I suppose 
I might have quoted passages like 
the above (from Silas Marner and
Middlemarch) as examples of the
field of mental inquiry which goes 
by that name. I was 19. I was
pondering what I might apply to
study at Clare. I chose philosophy
(then called Moral Sciences). I had
already read Berkeley and Hobbes. 
I knew about Descartes and Kant. 
I was almost convinced by Bentham
and Mill. David Hume intrigued me
but seemed a touch beyond me: 
I wanted someone to help me
understand him. And I had recently
become interested in the work 
of that great 18th-Century
philosopher of “natural” religion,
Bishop Joseph Butler. Surely, then,
the Philosophy Tripos would be 
right for me? It rather seemed so.
True, when one surveyed the
advice and information offered by 
the Cambridge Faculty, names like
these, though they did appear, were
hardly writ large in the schemes of
possible study. There appeared to be
more about the Philosophy of Mind,
and Logic, and Language, and
endeavours of many kinds to study
our own brains and the organisation
of knowledge. But something called
Ethics did appear on the list, and 
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Chauvinist Days
Matthew Parris
judiciary. Not since the great 
exchange between HLA Hart 
(in the liberal cause) and Patrick
Devlin (in the conservative cause)
inspired by the 1960s Wolfenden
recommendations for reform of 
the law on homosexuality, has the
jurisprudential debate in Britain
really sparkled. The late Lord
Devlin’s The Enforcement of Morals
remains a commanding tract, never
satisfactorily countered by liberals
like me.
I threw myself into Jurisprudence
in my final year with delight and
relief — and ease. I was learning
habits of thought which were to 
stay with me. In politics, in
journalism, and in the commonplace
interpretation of every-day law,
hardly a day has passed in the thirty
years since when the mental facility
to distil principle from fact has not
my fellow-undergraduates, who
really excelled at (and enjoyed)
Cambridge’s version of philosophy,
were among the cleverest of their
generation, all cleverer than me. 
But the philosophy I wanted to
study, and in the end had to flee 
the Faculty to study, will serve me
daily for the rest of my life. I cannot
think that philosophy as the word 
is commonly understood is
inconsequential, and I cannot
understand how any map of the
pursuit of knowledge could fail to
include an academic kingdom 
where it has pride of place.
Matthew Parris (Clare), former
Conservative MP, is a journalist and
author. His weekly column appears
in The Times on Saturdays.
proved useful to me. It is remarkable
how many lawyers and lawmakers
— let alone newspaper columnists —
are deficient in the facility.
The present Prime Minister, both
lawyer and lawmaker, is little-short
of retarded in his capacity to
distinguish between the facts and the
principles of a case. Nobody who
could recommend the criminalisation
of the “glorification” of terrorism,
without bothering to contemplate the
impossibility of defining “terrorism”
in a way which excludes some of the
noblest struggles in history, can 
claim an even elementary grasp of 
the philosophy of law. To be Prime
Minister, Tony Blair claimed in his
novelty-Podcast in January this year,
“you have to compartmentalise”.
That is a defect, not a skill.
I remain uncomfortably aware
that the young men and women, 
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www.cambridge.org/philosophy
For great thinking…
Descartes: A Biography
Desmond Clarke
Addresses the full range of Descartes’ interests
and traces his intellectual development.
£25.00 | HB | 500pp
20% discount now available: 
visit www.cambridge.org/alumni to order today
The Tasks of Philosophy & 
Ethics and Politics
Selected Essays: Volumes 1 & 2
Alasdair MacIntyre
Available together for the first time,
these classic essays from one of the
most influential of modern
philosophers.  
£14.99 each | PB
Originally published as a 10-volume print set, the Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy is regarded as an essential resource in
the fields of philosophy and religion. REP online grows each year
with a diverse range of new material bringing scholarship and 
articles covering the latest developments in philosophical
inquiry. Over one hundred new entries have been specially 
commissioned since launch. In addition to this our programme
of regular revisions and updates of key entries as well as the 
editorially reviewed links to philosophy elsewhere on the web,
make REP online a reference for philosophers, scholars and 
students that is second to none.
The Routledge Encyclopedia of
Philosophy online
www.rep.routledge.com
For free trials, pricing information and to 
subscribe please contact:
UK & Rest of World Customers:
Tel: +44 (0)20 7017 6062 /6131
E-mail: reference.online@tandf.co.uk
A Library Journal Best Web Reference
'Surpasses the seemingly unsurpassable print reference... REP Online
reveals what it means to reinvent the conventional Encyclopedia
dynamically... This easy-to-use resource will definitely become the
first stop for philosophy research.’
FREE
TRIAL!
The Faculty gratefully acknowledges support for
this newsletter from 3M library security systems.
I was supposed to go to Music
College and become a concert
clarinettist, but at Cambridge you
can run a music life in tandem with 
a degree. After a gap year of
intellectual inactivity, Philosophy
was a welcome challenge. I started
with no formal background in the
subject: an innocent tabula rasa.
The Philosophy Tripos begins
with a logical shock, the general
groan of the first year being 
targeted at the compulsory formal
logic element. I began in silent
protest, given my artsy A-level
background, but I soon found the
logic seeping into my subconscious.
Rather worryingly, the night before
my IA exam, I had a disturbing
nightmare in which everything was
either an apple or an orange. 
Aside from corrupting my
unconscious thoughts, logic has 
also raised a few laughs such as my
nearly handing in an essay entitled
‘Does Cripple refute the descriptive
theory of names?’ after an over-
zealous spell-check. Followers of
Kripke will be comforted by his
thesis that names don’t abbreviate
descriptions, while Russellians 
might enjoy the image.
I have developed a range of
arguments to counter sceptical,
cynical and pragmatist critiques of
the value of my degree. The sceptical
line of attack is often targeted at 
the fantastical thought-experiments
that arise in the philosophical
laboratory. An aggressive NatSci
once started ridiculing the old
chestnut: ‘If a tree falls, and there is
no one around to hear, does it 
make a sound?’ Rather than getting
technical about Berkeley, I 
pointed out that if you ask a 
scientist the same question, he is
likely — after using up several
research grants — to reply: 
‘Well, we’ve solved it for elm and
birch, but we’re still working on 
the general case’. Subject-directed
scepticism runs both ways. 
A stronger attack is made by the
allied forces of cynicism and
pragmatism, which combine to
downplay the career prospects of 
the philosophy student. My parents,
falling under this umbrella,
comforted themselves with the 
hope that I would at least return for
my first Christmas break filled with
some of Nietzsche’s Songs from the
Gay Science; cellist and quasi-
philosopher George Corbett (Trinity),
and professional-philosopher
Dominic Scott (who let slip in one 
of his Plato lectures that he
moonlights as a pianist). After the
success of this now twice instantiated
event, there is discussion of a
Wittgenstein-themed concert, 
which would naturally feature a
performance of John Cage’s 4´33 ˝
with poker (‘whereof one cannot
speak, thereof one must be silent’).
I was never expected, and I never
expected, to continue in academia
post-Tripos. But I have caught the
Philosophy bug, and, in what 
might be termed a Cambridge
change (not mere), I plan to return
for graduate work after a year at
Harvard on a Kennedy Scholarship.
Laura Biron (Queens’) is a third-year
philosophy undergraduate
deep insights into the
meaning of life. 
I returned with a
holiday essay entitled 
‘Is the Present King of
France Bald?’. It wasn’t
until the summer of
2005, when I worked 
as a research student for
the Faculty’s Forum for
Philosophy in Business,
that they realised my
degree might make
contact with the so-
called ‘real world’,
especially when my
father found me taking
an active interest in his
tax return.
The research,
commissioned by
KPMG’s tax business
school, was a report on
the moral issues that
surround the legal
distinction between tax
avoidance and evasion.
Although I began the
project with my own
levels of scepticism at
red alert, I soon became
surprised by how
something as mundane
as taxation yields such
rich material for
philosophical reflection.
My work examined two competing
theories of property rights —
libertarianism and conventionalism
— and drew out their implications
for debates currently raging in legal
and political circles about, for
example, the connection between 
tax avoidance and corporate 
social responsibility. Do the
responsibilities of corporations
extend to the avoidance of 
‘aggressive’ tax planning, or does 
this conflict with financial
obligations to shareholders? 
This and related questions are 
now being followed up by the
Forum.
I have found peaceful
reconciliation of my musical and
philosophical selves. Last year there
was a happy marriage in a
Philosophers’ Concert. In addition 
to my clarinet playing, the concert
featured fellow third-year
philosopher and mezzo-soprano
Clare Jarmy (St Catharine’s) singing
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Scepticism at Red Alert
Laura Biron
Well, me. For the
Philosophy Faculty,
that is, not in general.
I know nothing about
fundraising. Zilch. If
there were such a book
as Fundraising for
Dummies I’d have to
start at the very
beginning and the first
sentence on page one
would multiply my
knowledge tenfold. I’ve
done charity bicycle
rides, the so-called
“disease rides” that
abound in America.
This requires me to ask
friends for ten or
twenty dollars per, until
I’m up to two or three
hundred dollars, and
then go and ride nearly
two hundred miles in two days to
make an honest woman of myself, 
so that I can tell them, and tell myself,
that yes, I finished the ride. If I lose
my nerve and funk asking enough
people for pledges, which I usually
do, I can just make up the rest of the
two or three hundred dollars myself.
This isn’t really fundraising, it’s a
way to set a personal challenge for
myself. Think of the part about 
asking for contributions as low-level
blackmail. It’s nicer to call it “moral
suasion”, but it relies on people who
can’t very well say “no” and who (I
hope!) have never had any particular
connection with the relevant disease.
The campaign for philosophy 
at Cambridge really is fundraising, 
and of the very most important kind.
And I’m participating in the American
gift to the Faculty in his
memory.
The other reason is
that I believe that a
healthy and thriving
philosophy program is
of absolutely vital
importance to any first-
rate university and 
to its students, and I 
want to help philosophy
to thrive at Cambridge.
Although I studied
philosophy and for
some years taught
philosophy to
undergraduates, 
I’m no professional
philosopher. At best 
I can call myself an
amateur metaphysician.
But I continue to be 
in contact with the
profession. I chaired the American
Philosophical Association’s committee
on non-academic careers, and I
presently serve as that organization’s
treasurer. My own job skills are mainly
the skills of a philosopher; arguing
clearly, disentangling other, less
coherent, arguments, and explaining
things to people. Philosophy isn’t just
for philosophers: it encourages very
general clarity of mind. Philosophy is
very good for the inside of the head. 
Steffi Lewis works in municipal
finance, and is the co-author, with
David Lewis, of “Holes”
part of that campaign. Why me? 
Well, two reasons.
One reason is my connection with
the Faculty. For my part it is one of
my old and valued friendships. 
My late husband, the Princeton
philosopher David Lewis, was a
frequent, if informal, visitor to
Cambridge, and I often came along.
David would visit the Moral Sciences
Club, or give a talk, or hear somebody
else give one. And he would talk
about philosophy at length and in
depth, principally with Hugh Mellor,
sometimes at home and sometimes in
the pub, latterly usually the Cambridge
Blue. This sounds like not much of a
connection, but it was such that the
University favored David with the
honorary degree of Litt. D. I have made
what is for me a pretty substantial 
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Steffi and David Lewis at Cape Schanck, Victoria (Photo by Alan Hájek)
Who’d be a Fundraiser?
Steffi Lewis
From the Editor
We want to hear from you!
The Editor welcomes all comments
and suggestions or material for future
editions of the Newsletter.
Please contact:
Mrs Mariella Pellegrino
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Cambridge
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge
CB3 9DA
U.K.
Phone: +44 1223 331889
Fax: +44 1223 335091
email: mp10004@cam.ac.uk
A downloadable version of the
Newsletter is available from the
Faculty website:
www.phil.cam.ac.uk
A Moral Sciences Club meeting (Jonathan Barnes, 24 January 2006) (Photo by Hugh Mellor)
For this reason I believe a case can 
be made for music-making to be 
at the centre — and not at the
periphery — of education. 
An additional important reason 
is that music — like the other arts —
offers a vital space in which a rich
spiritual life can develop, especially
for those for whom religious belief 
is impossible or unpalatable. 
(For some time in Hungary, under
the influence particularly of Kodaly,
music did take a much more central
place in the curriculum.)
Despite the different worlds they
inhabit, I feel that a philosophical
training frequently helps my music-
making. Clarity and sharpness of
mind can be crucial in diagnosing
and solving problems, both musical
and technical.
Also, I am often struck by a type
of rehearsal deadlock which I call
“pendulum rehearsing”. This results
from apparently irreconcilable
disagreement, for instance, when a
One philosophical issue which
sometimes enters into musicians’
reflections is the question of objective
truth versus subjective opinion. Is
there truth in certain interpretations
and falsity in others, or is it all just a
matter of taste? Whilst no-one has a
monopoly of the truth, I would argue
that there is indeed a valid concept
of truth in musical interpretation,
and that a musical work has a
fundamental nature and structure
which imposes a discipline within
which any true interpretation must
fall. Some interpretations can distort
or even wholly misunderstand that
basic structure and character. Some
may not be characterised clearly
enough. Others may be on the right
lines but inadequately responsive or
too cold. Still others are too hysterical
or “Hollywood”, or as the Hungarian
violinist Sandor Vegh used to put it,
“too beautiful to be true”.
David Waterman (Trinity) is the
cellist of the Endellion Quartet.
group may find itself swinging
fruitlessly between a faster and a
slower tempo without ever satisfying
all the players. Many domestic and
political disagreements also suffer
from this frustrating pendulum
effect, and they often have that
peculiarly intractable feel of
philosophical paradoxes.
A way must be found through such
dilemmas by relocating or redefining
the problem in a new context where it
may dissolve. In our example of tempo
there are various ways of trying to
break down the simple dichotomy of
‘slower’ or ‘faster’. Whether a passage
feels fast or slow is not only dependent
on the metronome speed but on many
other factors, and these need
examination when changing the speed
is not helping. The feel of a tempo can
be a function of details of phrase-
length, articulation, colour, texture,
rhythmic flexibility, and, above all, the
overall mood of an interpretation and
changes in these factors can resolve the
problem which appeared to reside in
the metronome speed alone.
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Faculty News
This year again many members of the Faculty,
including several of our current and past students,
have had their achievements recognised by
appointments, promotions, awards, elections and
invitations to give lectures around the globe.
A few highlights follow:
Jane Heal was an invited speaker at the Chapel
Hill Colloquium, talking on her book Mind and
Value. Simon Blackburn was Truax lecturer,
Hamilton College, NY; Lewis Frumkes lecturer,
New York University; and Stanislaw Kaminski
lecturer, University of Lublin. He also gave the
Presidential Address at the Joint Session of the
Aristotelian Society and Mind Association.
Alex Oliver was awarded a University
Pilkington Prize for excellence in teaching and was
promoted to a Readership.
Hallvard Lillehammer and Serena Olsaretti
were promoted to Senior Lectureships.
Neil Sinclair was appointed to a one-year
lectureship at Wadham, Oxford and Rebecca Roache
is now a Junior Research Fellow at the Future of
Humanity Institute at Oxford. In October 2006,
Mary Leng, David Liggins, and Jan Westerhoff take
up Lectureships in the Philosophy Departments of
Liverpool, Manchester and Durham.
Laura Biron, third-year undergraduate (see her
article on page 6) and Harry Adamson, MPhil
student, have been awarded Kennedy Memorial
Trust Scholarships for 2006–07.
PHILOSOPHY FROM OXFORD
The Oxford Companion
to Philosophy 2/e
Edited by TED HONDERICH
‘A philosophical work
that is genuinely 
entertaining ... by far
the best - and best
value - philosophical 
reference book on the
market.’ OBSERVER
Offers enlightening and enjoyable 
discussions of all aspects of
philosophy, and of the lives and
work of the great philosophers
from antiquity to the present day.
March 2005 | 1,076 pages
Hb|0-19-926479-1/978-0-19-926479-7|£30.00
The Oxford Dictionary
of Philosophy 2/e
SIMON BLACKBURN
‘The most
comprehensive
dictionary of philosophy
in English.’
TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT
This best-selling 
dictionary is written by one of the
most famous philosophers of our
time, and widely recognised as
the best dictionary of its kind. 
October 2005 | 416 pages
Pb|0-19-861013-0/978-0-19-861013-7|£9.99
Hb|0-19-861014-9/978-0-19-861014-4|£22.50
The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy
Edited by FRANK JACKSON and MICHAEL SMITH
The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy is the
definitive guide to what's going on in this lively and 
fascinating subject. Jackson and Smith, themselves two of
the world's most eminent philosophers, have assembled
more than thirty distinguished scholars to contribute
incisive and up-to-date critical surveys of the principal
areas of research.
October 2005 | 920 pages
Hb|0-19-924295-X / 978-0-19-924295-5|£55.00 
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